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Abstract: 
We design a laboratory experiment to illuminate the channels through which 
relatively more attractive individuals receive higher wages. Specifically, we are 
able to distinguish taste-based discrimination from rational statistical 
discrimination and biased beliefs. Using three realistic worker tasks to increase 
the external validity of our results, we find that the “beauty premium” is highly 
task-specific: while relatively more attractive workers receive higher wage bids in 
a bargaining task, there is no such premium in either an analytical task or a data 
entry task. The premium in the bargaining task is driven by biased beliefs about 
worker performance. We find that there is substantial learning after worker-
specific performance information is revealed, highlighting the importance of 
accounting for longer-run interactions in studies of discrimination. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Labor market discrimination based on characteristics such as gender, age, race, and national 
origin is illegal. Appearance-based discrimination, while not currently unlawful in most labor 
markets, has been the subject of several lawsuits in recent years.1 In the academic literature, 
several studies have found that people who are relatively more attractive are paid more, even 
when the situation does not appear to warrant it (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and 
Hamermesh, 1998). This phenomenon has been termed the “beauty premium.” It appears to be 
pervasive: versions of the beauty premium have been found in settings that include credit 
markets (Ravina, 2009), professional sports (Berri et al., 2011), and even elections (Berggren et 
al., 2010). Moreover, there is extensive evidence that beauty is correlated with career choices, 
including the choice to become a criminal (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and 
Hamermesh, 1998; Mocan and Tekin, 2010; von Bose, 2012; Deryugina and Shurchkov, 2013).  
One potential explanation for the beauty premium is that appearance may in fact be 
positively correlated with skills that are important for job performance but are not easily 
observed and thus cannot be controlled for in an empirical study, such as the ability to be 
persuasive. Another is that employers may overestimate the skills of relatively attractive people 
simply because they’re attractive. Finally, employers may have unbiased beliefs about 
performance but prefer hiring more attractive people (“taste-based discrimination”). Because 
most studies are observational rather than experimental, the existing evidence does not allow for 
these three channels to be credibly separated.  
We perform a computer-based laboratory experiment that allows us to distinguish these three 
causes from one another.2 We estimate the extent to which employers correctly predict the 
relationship between appearance and task performance, thus determining what share of the 
beauty premium, as measured by the wage bids, is statistical discrimination. Then, by 
appropriately controlling for performance predictions, we are able to estimate the portion of the 
beauty premium that is not driven by performance expectations. The direct estimation of this 
taste-based component of the beauty premium also adds to previous work in which researchers 
were able to impute some types of taste-based discrimination only from the way in which 
employer beliefs are elicited. Finally, because we observe workers’ actual performance, we also 
estimate the correlation between performance and worker appearance. Together with the 
relationship between employer performance predictions and worker appearance, this allows us to 
identify any biased beliefs about the skills of comparatively attractive people. 
Another innovation in our study meant to capture the diversity of real-world labor markets is 
that we estimate the extent to which the beauty premium is context-specific. We do this by 
randomly assigning one of three tasks to workers: a data entry task, an analytical task, or a 
bargaining task in which workers see pictures of their bargaining opponents. The rest of the 
experimental procedure remains identical across the tasks. To our knowledge, our study is the 
first to credibly test whether the beauty premium varies with the types of skills involved in 
completing a task and, if so, to determine why. Because the tasks we choose are also more 
realistic than previously studied tasks, the variation we observe is likely to be similar to the 
variation in the beauty premium outside of the laboratory, therefore increasing the external 
validity of our results. 
                                                      
1 See for example Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) and Brice v. Resch and Krueger Int’l, Inc. (Corbett, 2011). 
2 See Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) for more experimental evidence on the beauty premium in the labor market, Andreoni and 
Petrie (2008) in public goods games, and Wilson and Eckel (2006) in trust games. 
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Our study is also the first to investigate how the signal value of appearance regarding a 
worker’s ability changes with information. It is possible that attractiveness is used as a proxy for 
ability at the “recruiting” stage, modeled in our experimental setting with the first round. 
However, it might become increasingly irrelevant as employers observe actual worker 
performance. To test for the existence of this type of learning, we reveal workers’ first round 
performance to all employers. We then repeat the prediction, bidding, and task performance 
stages, allowing employers to update their bids and expectations. We then estimate what portion 
of the beauty premium disappears once performance measures for each worker are available.  
We find a significant beauty premium in bargaining but not in the other two tasks (data 
analysis or data entry). In particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in worker attractiveness is 
associated with a 28 per cent increase in the employer’s wage offer when the workers engage in 
a bargaining task, even after including extensive controls. By dividing attractiveness ratings into 
quintiles, we show that the most attractive subjects (those in the top quintile of beauty) benefit 
most significantly relative to the least attractive subjects. Our conclusion that the beauty 
premium is highly context-specific is consistent with results reported in the non-experimental 
literature, which finds substantial beauty-based sorting into different occupations (Hamermesh 
and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; Mocan and Tekin, 2010; von Bose, 2012; 
Deryugina and Shurchkov, 2013). 
The beauty premium is completely explained by statistical discrimination: employers believe 
that more attractive workers will perform better in bargaining, where workers can see one 
another’s picture, but not in data entry or data analysis. This belief turns out to be incorrect: there 
is no significant relationship between the attractiveness rating and performance in any of the 
tasks, including bargaining.  
We find that the beauty premium completely vanishes in the second round of bidding, which 
suggests that employers learn quickly that performance is uncorrelated with attractiveness. Past 
performance is also a significant determinant of wages in the second round, largely because it 
affects employer beliefs about worker performance. Both these facts suggest that there is 
substantial updating by employers and that biased beliefs correct themselves quickly when 
objective information about performance is available. 
The intersection of gender and the beauty premium has been a topic of several non-labor 
market studies (Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999; Rosenblat, 2008). We build upon this literature to 
find no systematic evidence that female or male workers benefit disproportionally from 
attractiveness. Comparatively attractive males are expected to perform significantly better in 
bargaining, but do not receive larger wage bids than comparatively attractive females or less 
attractive males. Moreover, this expectation turns out to be incorrect.  
Our general approach shows that having measures of both (a) expectations about a worker’s 
performance and (b) the willingness to hire the worker (by giving her a relatively higher wage 
offer) are helpful for separating different kinds of discrimination. This idea can be applied in 
other settings and to other types of discrimination. For example, asking car dealers how much 
money they expect to make on a particular sale and observing their actual bargaining behavior 
can help determine whether offers made to women and minorities are driven by statistical or 
taste-based discrimination, something an earlier study on the subject was not able to determine 
conclusively (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995). Although other methods for distinguishing taste-
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based from statistical discrimination have been used, direct elicitation of beliefs may be 
preferable, as it relies on fewer assumptions.3 
Because of the experimental nature of our work, addressing its external validity is important. 
According to the theory of discrimination (Becker, 1957), taste-based discrimination is predicted 
to arise in real-world settings when employers expect to derive direct utility from future face-to-
face interactions with relatively more attractive workers. Such face-to-face interactions are 
absent in our experiment, making it difficult to claim that our findings about the absence of taste-
based discrimination generalize to the typical office setting. However, the importance of settings 
where appearance is observable only through a photograph is growing with the rise of online 
labor markets, such as oDesk (Pallais, 2013), and online credit markets, such as Prosper (Ravina, 
2009; Duarte et al., 2012). Moreover, with the increasing number of “telecommuting” workers, 
the old paradigm of “face time” is changing.4  In addition, hiring in some cases is done by temp 
agencies or human resources departments, which are functionally removed from daily 
interactions with the hired workers. Our findings about taste-based discrimination are most 
directly relevant to such settings.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of 
our experimental procedures and descriptive statistics. Section 3 outlines the framework that 
allows us to differentiate biased beliefs about performance, statistical discrimination, and taste-
based discrimination. Section 4 reports and discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Overview of the Experiment 
2.1. The Stylized Labor Market 
 
The experiment was conducted at the Decision Science Laboratory at Harvard University. 
Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students from Harvard and other Boston-area 
universities. Each session included four employers and four workers. Sessions differed according 
to the task workers had to perform, which was randomly assigned for each session (see Section 
IIB below).  The first four subjects to arrive at the laboratory and sign the consent form (our 
“employers”) were immediately taken from the waiting room, photographed, and seated at their 
stations. The next four subjects to arrive at the laboratory and sign a consent form (our 
“workers”) were photographed and seated afterwards.5 In order to avoid further face-to-face 
interactions between the two groups, employers and workers were seated at stations separated by 
a wall divider.  
All subjects started by having their photograph taken and answering survey questions about 
several characteristics that are relevant to the labor market (student status, major, and GPA as 
well as levels of typing, analytical, and communication skills) before being told whether they 
would be employers or workers. After receiving the experimental instructions, which included 
detailed information about the task workers would perform, employers were granted access to a 
                                                      
3 Evidence consistent with statistical and taste-based discrimination has been found by Castillo et al. (2012) in a field study on 
gender differences in bargaining outcomes over taxi fares in Peru. Their study differs from ours insofar as it takes place in a non-
labor-market setting in which beliefs are not elicited directly, but rather are inferred from observed initial price quotes. 
4 For example, the online marketplace, oDesk, consists of workers all over the world who complete approximately 200,000 hours 
of work per week remotely (Pallais, 2013). In the US, telecommuting increased 73% from 2005 to 2011, and 64 million U.S 
employees holds a job that is compatible at least part-time telework (Global Workplace Analytics, 2011). 
5 Most subjects arrived in the laboratory within ten minutes of one another, which ensures almost random role assignment.  By 
assigning the role of employer to the first four subjects and removing them from the waiting room, we minimized the likelihood 
of face-to-face interactions between employers and workers that may have otherwise occurred during the initial waiting period. 
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website that displayed worker photographs and the corresponding “résumés” based on each 
worker’s survey answers. In 25 sessions, photos were shown on the front webpage with links to 
résumé information underneath each photo. In 22 sessions, this order was reversed. 
The remainder of the experiment, programmed using the standard zTree software package 
(Fischbacher, 2007), consisted of two procedurally identical rounds. Each round started with a 
prediction stage during which employers submitted estimates for the expected performance of 
each worker in the subsequent task (Eij), where i indexes employers and j indexes workers, and 
workers submitted estimates for their own expected performance (Ej). This information was kept 
secret from all other subjects. The wages of both employers and workers were partly determined 
by the accuracy of their predictions, ensuring that subjects had incentives to guess correctly. 
Next, employers submitted wage offers to “hire” workers. The total amount offered to four 
workers could not exceed a predetermined maximum number of points.6 We employed a second-
price sealed-bid auction to allocate workers to employers: the employer with the highest wage 
offer for a particular worker “hired” that person and had to pay the worker the second highest 
wage (Wj) offered to that worker. Each employer could be matched with between zero and four 
workers, depending on the wage offers. A worker could be left unmatched if all four employers 
offered a zero wage to that worker, although this did not happen in practice. The wage amount (if 
any) was not revealed to the worker until after the task completion stage.7 The identity of the 
employer was never revealed to the worker. Employers had full knowledge about the tasks 
workers were to perform prior to making performance predictions and wage bids. 
The task completion stage began after employer–worker matching was established. The task 
was randomly chosen prior to the start of the session to be a bargaining task, a data entry task, or 
a data analysis task (see detailed task descriptions below). Table 1 shows the number of sessions 
for each task type and the corresponding number of subjects who participated in a given session. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Each round ended with an information screen. Employers learned about the performance 
of every worker and their own payoffs for the round. Workers learned about their own 
performance and payoffs for the round, including any wage payment. The following equations 
represent the total within-round payoffs. 
 
Employer i’s Payoff: 
π௜ ൌ 125 ൅ 13෍ ௧ܲ ௝ܻ
ସ
௝ୀଵ
ൈ ܪ݅ݎ݁௜,௝ െ෍ ௝ܹ
ସ
௝ୀଵ
ൈ ܪ݅ݎ݁௜,௝ െ ܯ௧෍| ௝ܻ െ ܧ௜,௝|
ସ
௝ୀଵ
 
 
Worker j’s Payoff:  
                                                      
6 In 22 earlier sessions, this amount equaled the employer’s endowment of 125 points, while in the 25 subsequent sessions this 
amount was raised to 175 points with the endowment remaining at 125 points. The increase was meant to allow employers to 
base their bids on their estimates of expected worker performance rather than on the mechanical constraint imposed by the bid 
maximum. The bid maximum does not affect the results; see the online appendix for details. 
7 If employers expect more attractive workers to be more likely to reciprocate a higher wage with higher effort, then, by 
withholding the wage offer information until after the worker completes the task, we are shutting down the potential “gift-
exchange” mechanism behind the beauty premium.  First, introducing this additional channel would greatly complicate our 
already complex design. Furthermore, the gift-exchange channel is unlikely to drive the beauty premium, as previous work has 
found that more attractive individuals do not exhibit greater levels of reciprocity relative to their less attractive counterparts (see 
Wilson and Eckel (2006) in trust games, for example). 
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π௝ ൌ 25 ൅ 23 ௧ܲ ௝ܻ ൅ ௝ܹ െ ܯ௧| ௝ܻ െ ܧ௝| 
 
Where ݅ ∈ ሼ1,4ሽ	 is the set of employers, ݆ ∈ ሼ1,4ሽ	 is the set of workers, and 
ݐ ∈ ሼܦܽݐܽ	ܧ݊ݐݎݕ, ܦܽݐܽ	ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏ݅ݏ, ܤܽݎ݃ܽ݅݊݅݊݃ሽ	is the set of tasks; ௧ܲ  is the piece rate of 5 
points for  t = Data Analysis and 1 point for the other tasks; ܯ௧ is the weight on the deviation of 
the performance estimate from actual output and equals ହସ	 for t = Data Analysis and 
ଵ
ସ	 otherwise; ܪ݅ݎ݁௜,௝ is an indicator function that takes on the value of 1 if worker j was hired by employer i, 
and 0 otherwise. The last term in both equations represents a “misprediction penalty” that we 
include in order to incentivize truth-telling in accordance with other studies (Mobius and 
Rosenblat, 2006).8 
At the end of the session, all subjects filled out a post-experiment questionnaire that asked for 
detailed demographic information. Mean earnings in the experiment (including the show-up fee) 
equaled $17.12 with a standard deviation of $2.22. Sessions lasted approximately one hour. 
Experiment instructions and questionnaire contents are available in the online appendix. 
2.2. The Tasks 
 
We deliberately focus on tasks with which employers are more likely to be familiar and thus 
in which appearance-based differences in expectations are more likely to be correct. The 
abovementioned laboratory study on the beauty premium (Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006) focuses 
on a task type with which employers are unlikely to have prior experience and finds a substantial 
beauty premium despite the absence of beauty-based differences in performance. Because of the 
lack of familiarity with the task, however, it is not clear whether it is reasonable for employers to 
expect appearance-based performance differences. For example, it is possible that employers are 
extrapolating their beliefs from other situations in which more attractive people do have a 
performance advantage. Having workers perform realistic tasks increases our confidence in 
determining whether any beauty-based differences in performance predictions or wage bids are 
due to rational performance expectations, biased beliefs, or tastes. 
Ex-ante, employers may have differing expectations about the relationship between 
attractiveness and performance in each of the three tasks, either because of a true correlation 
between the two or because of biased beliefs. For example, elementary school children presented 
with photos of 10 individuals (all scientists) “showed a decided tendency to identify the smiling 
pictures as not being scientists” (Bottomley et al., 2001). In a “Draw a Scientist” experiment, 
children typically draw an unattractive white male wearing a white lab coat and glasses 
(Chambers, 1983). In a recent study, Deryugina and Shurchkov (2013) find that comparatively 
attractive female undergraduates perform worse than their less attractive counterparts on blindly 
graded quantitative reasoning tests and SATs and are less likely to choose a science major or 
become scientists. Thus, in the more difficult analytical task, we may find comparatively 
attractive individuals receiving lower wage offers because of the common stereotype that people 
who are good at such tasks are less attractive. 
                                                      
8 Incentivized belief elicitation may distort worker incentives during the task completion stage, leading to a “hedging bias”.  On 
the other hand, monetary incentives increase truth-telling and reduce the “noise” in the beliefs data (Gachter and Renner, 2006). 
We prioritize the latter issue, given the recent finding that the former may not be a serious concern in belief elicitation 
experiments (Blanco et al, 2010). In addition, to minimize concerns about hedging bias, we chose a relatively small Mt and a 
generous exchange rate from points to money to ensure a salient reward for any additional effort exerted once the expected 
predicted performance level has been attained.  
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On the other hand, researchers have found that attractive subjects get higher offers and 
therefore outperform their less attractive counterparts in simple bargaining games even without 
face-to-face interactions, such as the ultimatum game (Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999). Thus, 
employers in our experiment may expect more attractive workers to perform better in our 
bargaining task, and therefore incorporate these expectations in their wage offers. Finally, in the 
simple data entry task, we do not expect to see beauty-based performance or wage offer 
differences unless attractiveness happens to be correlated with another previously unidentified 
skill.  
 
2.2.1. Data Entry 
 
In the data entry task, workers had six minutes to enter numerical data that they read off a 
sheet of paper into an Excel spreadsheet. The goal was to enter as much data as possible. The 
data consisted of various economic statistics for regions in Russia. The spreadsheets had been 
opened on the workers’ computers prior to the start of the experiment with the column and row 
headings prepared in advance, so that subjects had only to enter numerical values into the correct 
cells. The data had to be entered exactly as it appeared to receive credit. Workers were credited 
with one point per correctly entered item. There was no penalty for an incorrectly entered item. 
 
2.2.2. Data Analysis 
 
In the data analysis task, workers answered as many mathematical questions as possible, 
up to a maximum of 30 questions. Questions were based on data that were similar to those used 
in the data entry task. Workers had six minutes for the first 15 questions and six minutes for the 
second 15 questions. Because some questions required basic mathematical calculations, workers 
could use calculators that had been placed on their desks in advance. Workers were credited with 
five points per correctly answered question, and there was no penalty for answering questions 
incorrectly. In our analysis, we likewise convert performance measures into points, multiplying 
the number of answers by five points. 
 
2.2.3. Bargaining 
 
In the bargaining task, workers were randomly assigned as buyers or sellers of a “widget” 
and participated in three 90-second periods of a standard double-auction. Including the time it 
took workers to read the information screen, which was not part of the 90-second limit, the 
bargaining task lasted about six minutes, on average. Workers were randomly re-matched and 
roles were randomly assigned with every new bargaining period. Each worker saw a photo of his 
or her bargaining partner on a computer screen.9 Every time a transaction was made, the seller’s 
profit equaled the difference between the price and the seller’s true cost of the “widget,” and the 
buyer’s profit equaled the difference between the buyer’s true value and the price of the 
“widget.” Profits were calculated in tokens and then converted into points at the rate of 1 token = 
1 point. If the time ran out before a transaction was made, both the buyer and the seller earned 0 
tokens in that bargaining period. Each token was equivalent to one point for the purposes of 
calculating the total payoff for the round. Buyers’ values and sellers’ costs were determined 
randomly from two uniform distributions. In some cases, the buyer’s value was below the 
                                                      
9 Importantly, employers were made fully aware that workers could see the photo of their bargaining partner, but that no face-to-
face interactions among workers would take place at any point. 
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seller’s cost, making profitable agreements impossible. To avoid the possibility of negative 
profits, sellers could not agree to an offer that was lower than their cost and buyers could not 
agree to an offer that was higher than their value. 
2.3. The Rating Procedures 
 
The rating portion of the experiment was conducted at the University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign (UIUC). Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students from UIUC. During 
each session, 4–15 subjects (raters) were instructed to view and evaluate photos on a scale from 
1 (homely) to 10 (strikingly handsome or beautiful).10 Each rater was asked to look through four 
sets of 100 photos, which appeared in random order within each photo set. Due to the large 
number of photos, each rater evaluated only a subset of photos. The individual rating variable 
used in subsequent analysis is demeaned by the rater’s average across the photos that appeared in 
the same photo set; in other words, rater by photo-set fixed effects are implicitly controlled for in 
our analysis. 
Each rating session lasted between forty minutes and one hour, including the reading of the 
instructions and payment. Raters were paid a show-up fee of $5 and an additional $7 payment for 
completing the task of rating all photos and providing demographic information.11 
2.4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 We start with a total of 376 subjects split evenly between employers and workers. Our 
main unit of observation is employer-worker pairs, of which we have 16 per session (four 
employers each bidding on four workers) for a total of 752 pairs. However, a few subjects drop 
out of our sample. First, we exclude two pilot sessions held on December 7, 2011 from the main 
analysis. Second, we drop a subject who self-identified as a non-student (an employer). Third, 
we drop a subject who participated in our experiment twice, keeping the first instance (an 
employer) and dropping the second instance (a worker). Fourth, we drop five employers who did 
not use the worker résumé information (that is, who did not click on the worker’s photo or 
résumé). Including these observations does not significantly change the results. Finally, we also 
drop two subjects (workers) who chose to withdraw from our study after the experiment. The 
final dataset consists of 174 employers and 177 workers for a total of 685 employer-worker 
pairs. 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for employers and workers by task, gender, and 
round. The employers’ outcomes across our three tasks appear comparable. In Round 1, the 
average wage bid ranges from 24 to 29. While the mean wage bid in data analysis is statistically 
lower than in data entry or bargaining (with t-test p-values of 0.043 and 0.026, respectively), the 
difference of around four points on average is relatively small. Similarly, the employers predict 
statistically lower performance in data analysis (in points) relative to the other two tasks (t-test p-
value of < 0.001), but the differences are modest in size. 
Female employers bid slightly higher than males, but the differences are not statistically 
significant. Similarly, there are no significant gender differences in employers’ performance 
predictions and earnings in any of the tasks. 
 
                                                      
10 The scale was expanded from a 1–5 point scale previously used in the literature (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, 1998) to a 1–10 
point scale. 
11 Summary statistics for rater demographic information can be found in the online appendix. 
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In Round 1, male workers predict that they will perform better than female workers in the 
bargaining task (t-test p-value of 0.076). These predictions turn out to be correct, with males 
outperforming females by about 24 points in this task.  
Workers have significantly lower payoffs in data analysis than in the other two tasks in 
the first round (t-test p-value < 0.001). Workers earn significantly higher payoffs than employers 
in data entry and bargaining (t-test p-values of < 0.001 and 0.026, respectively), but employers 
earn significantly greater payoffs in data analysis (t-test p-value of 0.009). 
In Round 2, the average wage bid ranges from 22 to 33. Females placed higher bids than 
males in the bargaining task (t-test p-value of 0.077). Worker performance predictions in the 
second round do not significantly differ by gender. There is no significant difference between 
male and female worker performance in data entry or bargaining, but there is a significant 
difference between males and females in data analysis, with males outperforming females by 
about 2.6 questions. 
Again, payoffs for workers are significantly lower in data analysis than in the other two 
tasks (t-test p-value of < 0.001). Workers also make significantly higher payoffs than employers 
in data entry and bargaining (t-test p-values of < 0.001 and 0.030, respectively). Female 
employers earn significantly greater payoffs than female workers in data analysis (t-test p-value 
of < 0.001), but there is no difference between male employers and workers. 
Table 3 provides the summary statistics on subject attractiveness and other characteristics 
by gender for employers and workers. There are no statistically significant differences in 
attractiveness between either men and women or employers and workers in our sample. In our 
sample of workers, there are no statistically significant differences in any of the individual 
characteristics, on average. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Before proceeding with more formal regression analysis, we estimate a simple correlation to 
test for the existence of the beauty premium in our experiment. Table 4 reveals the correlation 
between wage bids and attractiveness, without controlling for worker characteristics. When 
pooling all tasks, we find a significant positive correlation between the natural logarithm of the 
wage bid and worker attractiveness in both rounds. All specifications in Table 4 include date 
fixed effects with standard errors clustered by employer.  
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results shown in columns 1 and 4 pool the data across tasks and include task fixed 
effects. Panel 1 shows that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in attractiveness 
increases the wage bid by about 16 per cent in both rounds. When we further decompose our 
analysis by task, we do not find any statistically significant relationship between beauty and 
wage bids in either the data entry or the data analysis task (Columns 2, 3, 6, and 7). However, the 
beauty premium is statistically significant in the bargaining task (Columns 4 and 8): a one 
standard deviation increase in attractiveness increases the wage bid by about 23 per cent in each 
round. Later in the paper, we elucidate the mechanisms behind this task-specific correlation. 
In Panel 2 of Table 4, we investigate whether gender differences are more pronounced when 
we allow the beauty premium to vary for male and female workers. Columns 1–4 show that the 
beauty premium in the first round is driven by the higher wages offered to comparatively 
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attractive female workers. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
male and female ratings are identical. In the second round, attractiveness is marginally 
significant for men in bargaining, although again we fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the male and female ratings are equal. In data entry, more attractive women 
receive significantly higher wage bids than men (the coefficients on the male and female ratings 
are statistically different), which is possibly due to females reporting higher typing skills than 
males. 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
In this section, we outline a general framework for separating statistical discrimination 
from taste-based discrimination and testing whether statistical discrimination, if there is any, is 
based on rational or biased beliefs. 
To separate taste-based discrimination from statistical discrimination, we use the fact that 
the performance prediction captures the employer’s beliefs about actual worker performance, 
while the bid captures the value the employer derives from worker performance and from his or 
her attractiveness. Thus, if only statistical discrimination is present (whether or not beliefs about 
performance are correct), then any effect of attractiveness on wage bids should operate only 
through the performance expectation. In other words, once we properly control for the 
performance prediction, worker’s attractiveness should have no further explanatory power in the 
case of pure statistical discrimination. If the effect of attractiveness on the employer’s wage bid 
is significant after controlling for the performance prediction, we conclude that there is taste-
based discrimination, as a result of which employers bid more on more attractive workers even 
though they do not expect them to be more productive. Because the employer’s bid for such a 
worker is likely to exhibit a nonlinear relationship with her performance prediction, we allow the 
performance prediction to enter the specification flexibly, as the within-employer rank of the 
worker’s performance prediction.12 
 
log	ሺ1 ൅ ௜ܹ௝ሻ ൌ ߚ ௝ܽ ൅෍ߛ௥1ሾܴܽ݊݇௜௝ሺܧ௜ሾߠ௝ሿሻ ൌ ݎሿ
ସ
௥ୀଶ
൅ ௝ܺᇱߩ ൅ ߜ் ൅ ߪ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝																				ሺ1ሻ 
 
where ݅ indexes the employer and  ݆ indexes the worker. We suppress the round subscripts for 
tractability reasons. The variable ௜ܹ௝ is the bid of employer ݅ on worker ݆ in round 1 or round 2. 
The attractiveness rating is given by ௝ܽ , and ܧ௜ሾߠ௝ሿ is employer ݅’s expectation of worker ݆’s 
performance. Worker characteristics are captured by ௝ܺᇱ and include indicators for student status 
(graduate or undergraduate), major, GPA range, self-reported abilities, race, and gender. The 
coefficients of interest are represented by ߚ, which captures taste-based discrimination, and the 
set ߛ௥ , which captures statistical discrimination. The variable ݎ  indexes the performance 
prediction rank of the worker. In all specifications, we include a set of task fixed effects 
whenever we combine multiple tasks in a single regression (ߜ்), as well as a set of date fixed 
effects (ߪ௧). Standard errors in equation (1) are clustered by employer.  
                                                      
12 The optimal bidding strategy in our setting is not analytically tractable and is likely to vary nonlinearly with the performance 
prediction. Moreover, prior experimental literature finds that behavior consistently deviates from rational bidding strategies (e.g., 
Cooper and Fang, 2008). 
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 In order to determine whether employer beliefs about worker performance in a given task 
are correct on average, we test whether actual performance θ୨ and attractiveness α୨ are correlated 
using the following specification: 
 
log	ሺ1 ൅ ௝்ܲሻ ൌ ߩܽ௝ ൅ ௝ܺᇱߜ ൅ ߜ் ൅ ߪ௧ ൅ ݑ௜௝																				ሺ2ሻ 
 
where ݆  indexes the worker and T indexes the task. We suppress the round subscripts for 
tractability reasons. The variable ௝்ܲ is the performance of worker ݆ in task T in round 1 or in 
round 2. Worker characteristics are captured by ௝ܺᇱ. The coefficients of interest are represented 
by ߩ, which captures the correlation between ability and attractiveness. In all specifications, we 
include a set of task fixed effects whenever we combine multiple tasks in a single regression 
(ߜ்), as well as a set of date fixed effects (ߪ௧). Standard errors in equation (2) are clustered by 
worker. 
Our design also allows us to examine the effect of information on the beauty premium. The 
two-round setting captures the way in which repeated interactions between employers and 
workers in the labor market increase the amount of available information over time. The first 
round can be thought of as a trial period, during which the employer has limited information to 
use in forming a belief about the worker’s future productivity. A more precise signal indicating 
the worker’s ability arrives later on, once past performance can be observed (for example, when 
the worker comes up for a review or renegotiates her contract). If attractiveness ௝ܽ is used as a 
signal of ability ߠ௝, it should be less informative in the second round, after a worker’s actual 
performance is revealed. To test for this, we estimate equation (1) separately in round 1 and 
round 2. Moreover, we include the worker’s past performance in the round 2 regressions as an 
explicit test of whether employers update their beliefs and bidding behavior based on new 
performance information. 
Finally, we extend the analysis in equations (1) and (2) as follows. First, we allow the 
coefficient on the attractiveness rating to vary by attractiveness quintile to test for non-linear 
effects. Second, we separate the effects by gender to test whether the beauty premium may vary 
across male and female workers. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. The Sources of the Beauty Premium in the First Round 
 
We begin our analysis with the first round. The first round represents an environment with 
limited information in which prospective employers make predictions about worker performance 
based on worker photos and résumé characteristics. Because we can observe these characteristics 
perfectly, we can test whether the information from the résumé helps to explain the correlation 
between attractiveness and wage bids we find in the absence of these controls. 
 
Result 1: There is a significant beauty premium in the bargaining task in the first round. 
Furthermore, the beauty premium in bargaining is largest for the most attractive workers (those 
in the top attractiveness quintile). In the other two tasks, the beauty premium is absent on 
average, but exists for the moderately attractive workers in data entry.  
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Support for Result 1 comes from Table 5, which shows the relationship between the natural 
logarithm of the wage bid in round 1 and worker attractiveness, conditional on worker résumé 
characteristics: indicators for student status (graduate or undergraduate), major, self-reported 
abilities (typing, analytical, and communications), race, and gender. All specifications in Table 5 
also include date fixed effects with standard errors clustered by employer.13 Columns 1 and 2 
pool the data across tasks and include task fixed effects. Column 1 estimates the simple 
relationship between the wage bid and the attractiveness rating, while Column 2 breaks the 
attractiveness rating into quintiles to allow for a potential nonlinear relationship between beauty 
and wage offers. On average, a one standard deviation increase in attractiveness leads to a 14 per 
cent increase in the wage offer. Relative to the bottom quintile, workers in all four of the top 
quintiles receive higher wage bids, but the significant positive effect appears only for workers 
whose beauty rating falls into the 4th quintile (above-average looks, but not the most attractive).14 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
When we further decompose our analysis, we observe that the beauty premium varies by 
task. In particular, on average, we do not find a significant effect of beauty on wage bids in either 
the data entry or the data analysis task (Columns 3 and 5). In data entry, workers in the 2nd, 3rd, 
and 4th attractiveness quintile receive significantly higher wage bids relative to the bottom 
quintile (Column 4), with the moderately attractive workers (4th quintile) receiving the largest 
premium.15 On the other hand, none of the beauty quintiles receives a significantly higher wage 
than the first quintile in data analysis (Column 6). However, the coefficients are jointly 
significantly different from one another. For instance, moderately attractive workers (4th quintile) 
receive significantly higher wages than workers with below-average looks (2nd quintile), as well 
as those in the top attractiveness quintile (f-test p-values of 0.014 and 0.053, respectively). 
On average, we find a beauty premium only in the bargaining task (Column 7): a one 
standard deviation increase in attractiveness increases the wage bid by 28 per cent in the 
bargaining task. Column 8 shows that the beauty premium in the bargaining task is strongest for 
the top quintile (the most-attractive workers).16 We obtain similar results if we rank workers by 
attractiveness out of four in each session instead of using a continuous attractiveness variable: 
the beauty premium is still present only in bargaining with a unit increase in rank associated with 
an increase in the wage bid of 14% (p-value of 0.058). The rank results can be found in the 
online appendix. 
The fact that the beauty premium shows up most consistently in the task that was expected to 
be “beauty related” ex-ante but not in the tasks that were expected to be “beauty unrelated” 
suggests that it is performance expectations, rather than tastes, that explain the existence of the 
overall beauty premium. Because employer expectations about the relationship between 
attractiveness and performance should play a role in the relationship between attractiveness and 
                                                      
13 The results are robust to including employer fixed effects. The results are also not substantively different when we control for 
whether the workers’ photos or résumés were shown to the employers first. We do not include these specifications in the paper, 
but estimates are available upon request. 
14 An f-test reveals that the coefficients on the 4th and 5th quintiles are not statistically significant from one another. Jointly, the 
two coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero (f-test p-value of 0.09). Furthermore, the coefficients on the 4th 
and 5th quintiles are jointly significantly different from the coefficient on the 2nd quintile (f-test p-value of 0.097). 
15 An f-test shows that the three coefficients are marginally jointly significant (p-value of 0.105) and that the difference between 
the 4th and the 5th attractiveness quintiles is statistically significant (p-value of 0.029). 
16 An f-test reveals that the coefficient on the 5th quintile is also statistically significantly different from the coefficient on the 2nd 
quintile (f-test p-value of 0.070). 
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wage offers, we next examine whether employers believe that more attractive workers are more 
productive in the three tasks. 
 
Result 2: Employers expect more attractive workers to be more productive in the bargaining 
task, but not in other tasks. These beliefs turn out to be incorrect. 
 
Table 6 estimates the relationship between an employer’s performance expectation and 
worker attractiveness. Specifically, we regress the natural logarithm of the employer’s prediction 
of worker performance in round 1 on the worker’s beauty rating or on the indicator that the 
beauty rating is in a given quintile. 
  
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
When we pool the data across tasks, we do not observe a significant relationship between 
worker attractiveness and employer performance prediction (Columns 1 and 2). As we 
anticipated, employers do not expect comparatively attractive workers to have a performance 
advantage in the data entry task (Columns 3 and 4). We also do not find a significant relationship 
between the worker’s average attractiveness and expected performance in the data analysis task 
(Column 5). However, employers expect workers whose looks are in the 2nd quintile to perform 
significantly better than those in the bottom quintile (Column 6). 17  A positive relationship 
between beauty and expected performance emerges in bargaining (Column 7 and 8). A one 
standard deviation increase in attractiveness, on average, is associated with a 4% increase in the 
mean performance prediction. Similarly, in a linear specification, a one standard deviation 
increase in the beauty rating results in a statistically significant 2.8 point increase in predicted 
performance. The linear results can be found in the online appendix. 
The effect appears to be driven by the high expectations for the most attractive workers: 
those in the 5th quintile are expected to perform 12% better in bargaining than the workers in the 
bottom quintile. 18  Once again, the linear specifications produce an even stronger positive 
relationship between beauty and predicted performance for the top attractiveness quintile (results 
available upon request). This finding is consistent with the “beauty-related” nature of the task, 
since workers can see their opponent’s photos during bargaining. 
Table 7 shows that employer expectations turn out to be incorrect in the bargaining task. We 
regress the natural logarithm of worker performance in round 1 on the average beauty rating or 
on the indicator that the beauty rating is in a given quintile. In this specification, standard errors 
are clustered by worker. Columns 7 and 8 (the bargaining task) also include a count variable for 
the number of bargaining periods during which trade was possible and control for the average 
difference between buyer value and seller cost across the three bargaining rounds. There is no 
systematic positive relationship between attractiveness and performance in any of the tasks, 
either on average or when we break the rating up into quintiles. Linear specifications with 
worker performance in levels produce qualitatively similar results. The results also do not change 
substantively if we omit the top attractiveness quintile instead of the bottom quintile. 
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                      
17 Employers also expect the second quintile to perform significantly better than the top quintile in data analysis (f-test p-value of 
0.047). 
18 The results do not change if we omit the top quintile of attractiveness instead of the bottom quintile from the regressions. 
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Thus far, we have established that the beauty premium in bargaining is at least partly 
explained by employer beliefs about performance and that these beliefs are incorrect. We next 
proceed to test whether there is any taste-based discrimination by explicitly controlling for 
employer beliefs about performance in the round 1 wage bid (equation 1). 
 
Result 3: The effect of beauty on wage bids disappears once we control for employer 
performance predictions, suggesting that there is no taste-based discrimination in our setting. 
 
Support for Result 3 comes from Table 8, which estimates the effect of attractiveness on 
wage bids in round 1, controlling for the employer prediction of worker performance. Beauty is 
no longer a significant determinant of the wage bid in any of the tasks. Although the second and 
fourth quintiles are significant in the data entry task, the lack of a pattern in that regression 
suggests that the correlation is likely spurious. Our results are robust to controlling for 
polynomials of the employer performance prediction in addition to the performance prediction 
ranks. 
 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As explained in Section 3, any residual relationship between beauty and wage bids can be 
interpreted as taste-based discrimination. Its absence in our setting suggests that employers are 
unwilling to sacrifice profits by hiring workers who are relatively attractive but not more 
productive. Overall, the evidence from Tables 5–8 shows that the statistical component of the 
beauty premium in the first round bargaining task can be explained by employers’ biased beliefs 
about the performance of comparatively attractive workers, rather than tastes or rational 
statistical discrimination based on worker résumé characteristics.  
4.2. Does Learning about Performance Eliminate the Beauty 
Premium in the Second Round?  
 
Recall that Table 4 documents a significant relationship between attractiveness and wage 
bids in the second round, comparable in magnitude to that in the first round. So far, the evidence 
suggests that employers use appearance as a signal of ability, at least for the task that might be 
perceived as favoring comparatively attractive workers. However, we have also shown that the 
employers’ beliefs are incorrect. Therefore, we proceed to examine the relationship between 
wage bids and beauty after relevant information about worker-specific previous performance is 
revealed to employers. Specifically, we estimate the effect of attractiveness on wage offers in the 
second round, with and without controlling for first-round performance information (see 
equation 1 in Section 3). We hypothesize that, because we don’t observe a significant 
relationship between attractiveness and performance, we should observe a reduction in the 
beauty premium in the second round relative to the first, which would indicate learning. 
 
Result 4: The beauty premium completely disappears in the second round. Information about 
past performance and employer expectations about future performance are both significant 
predictors of wage bids in the second round. 
 
Support for Result 4 comes from Tables 9 and 10. Table 9 shows that, even when we do not 
control for past performance or the performance prediction (Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), beauty is no 
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longer correlated with wage bids in any of the tasks. This pattern holds as we add controls for 
performance in round 1 (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). Given our earlier findings that (a) employers 
use attractiveness as a signal of performance in the first round and (b) there is no relationship 
between attractiveness and performance, the absence of a beauty premium in the second round 
suggests that employers have learned that attractiveness is not a signal of ability in this setting 
and thus no longer utilize it as information from which to form wage bids. The specifications that 
break up the beauty rating into quintiles produce similar results. In particular, we find no 
evidence of the beauty premium for any of the quintiles. Similarly, restricting the sample to the 
sessions where the task in the second round was the same as in the first round does not change 
the results. 
 
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The estimated effects of performance in the first round on second round bids also confirm 
that there is substantial learning between rounds. Past performance is a significant predictor of 
bids in all tasks, with employers bidding more on workers who performed better in the first 
round, all else equal. This is true even in cases where the first round task is different from the 
second round task, implying that employers expect performance in the three tasks to be 
correlated. 
Table 10 tests whether employer predictions of worker performance play a role in observed 
learning. Columns 1–4 show that employers no longer expect relatively more attractive workers 
to outperform less attractive workers in bargaining. As before, employers do not expect there to 
be a beauty advantage in the other two tasks. In fact, the point estimates on the average beauty 
rating are negative in the bargaining and data analysis task, although the negative value is not 
statistically significant.  
Columns 5–8 of Table 10 build on the results from Table 9 to show the effect of employer 
expectations on wage bids in the second round. Once we control for employer performance 
predictions, past performance is significant only in the bargaining task, reaffirming that 
employers also fully incorporate first-round information into their performance expectations.19 
Thus, we conclude that learning eliminates the influence of beauty on the wage bid by changing 
employers’ expectations of the relationship between beauty and worker performance. 
 
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.3. Does the Beauty Premium Vary by Gender? 
 
Table 4 shows that the simple correlation between attractiveness and wages varies by gender. 
In this section, we present a more formal analysis of the gender differences in the beauty 
premium. 
 
Result 5: There is no difference in the beauty premium by worker gender. However, employers’ 
performance expectations for comparatively attractive males and females differ from one 
another in data analysis and bargaining. These expectations turn out to be incorrect. 
 
                                                      
19 Interacting first-round performance with an indicator that the second-round task was the same as the first-round 
task does not change the results. 
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Support for this result comes from Tables 11 and 12. Table 11 estimates the beauty premium 
in the first round by task and gender. When we do not control for performance expectations 
(Columns 1–3), we find a significant positive coefficient on female but not male attractiveness. 
However, the point estimates are very similar and the female and male beauty coefficients are 
not significantly different from one another. When we control for the rank of the performance 
prediction (Columns 4–6), there is no significant relationship between attractiveness and bids for 
either gender, suggesting that any relationship between attractiveness and bids is again driven by 
statistical discrimination. 
 
[TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
  
Table 12 estimates the gender-specific relationship between employer performance 
expectations and attractiveness (Columns 1–3) and checks whether those expectations are correct 
(Columns 4–6). Although the beauty premium in bargaining does not vary by worker gender, 
employer expectations are different for comparatively attractive men than for comparatively 
attractive women. Relatively more attractive males are expected to perform marginally worse 
than less attractive males in the data analysis task, all else remaining equal. Furthermore, the 
expected beauty effects on data analysis performance for females (2.2%) and for males (-9.1%) 
differ significantly from one another (f-test p-value of 0.036). On the other hand, the positive 
effect of attractiveness of the employer prediction in bargaining from Table 6 is driven by the 
expectation that relatively more attractive males will have a performance advantage: 
comparatively attractive males are expected to outperform less attractive males by 10% in 
bargaining. Comparatively attractive females, on the other hand, are not expected to have a 
performance advantage in bargaining. The difference between males and females is statistically 
significant (f-test p-value of 0.001). 
 As before, the employer expectations turn out to be incorrect in data analysis and in 
bargaining: neither comparatively attractive males nor comparatively attractive females have an 
actual performance advantage in any of the tasks (Columns 4-6). 
 
[TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
5. Conclusion 
 
We develop and execute a new method for determining the precise channel through 
which attractiveness leads to higher worker wages. Our key insight is that having two measures, 
one that elicits expected worker performance and one that elicits employer willingness to pay, is 
both necessary and sufficient for separating statistical discrimination from taste-based 
discrimination without making restrictive assumptions. In addition, statistical discrimination can 
be further decomposed into biased beliefs and rational statistical discrimination if actual 
performance data are available.  
 We run a laboratory experiment designed to elicit the two measures described above as 
well as to identify the stability of the beauty premium across a range of settings. While carefully 
controlling the overall experimental environment, we vary the tasks that workers must perform. 
Our results indicate that the beauty premium is highly context-dependent: while we find strong 
evidence of a beauty premium in a bargaining task, there is no beauty premium in a data entry or 
data analysis task, on average. The beauty premium is composed entirely of statistical 
discrimination, which in turn can be explained by biased beliefs about the performance of 
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comparatively attractive workers rather than rational expectations. It also does not appear to vary 
by gender: even though employers expect more attractive males to perform better in bargaining 
and worse in data analysis, these beliefs are incorrect. We also find a strong learning effect: the 
beauty premium disappears after worker performance is revealed, even in cases where the task 
changes. This suggests that, in our setting, employers use attractiveness at the hiring stage 
primarily as an imperfect signal of ability. Thus, one implication of our results is that the beauty 
premium in the labor market may be explained by worker characteristics and employer 
performance beliefs that cannot be fully incorporated into the analysis of labor market outcomes 
in observational data. 
The absence of taste-based discrimination in our study may be explained in part by the 
minimal interactions between employers and workers in the experimental setting. Thus, our 
results may not generalize to situations in which there is substantial face-to-face contact: 
employers may be willing to pay more attractive workers higher wages due to taste on average, 
but do not do so in our case because they do not interact with workers in person. However, 
internet-based interactions are an increasingly important part of the modern economy. They are 
pervasive in online labor markets, such as oDesk, credit markets, such as Prosper, and even 
fundraising venues, such as Kickstarter. More generally, the spread of computers and the internet 
has transformed the modern workplace, with a growing fraction of workers spending all or most 
of their work time outside of the traditional office setting. Because of this trend, laboratory 
experiments, where subjects interact with each other largely through computers, are ever more 
relevant outside of the laboratory. Thus, our result pertaining to the absence of taste-based 
discrimination is highly applicable in these settings. 
Because we do not find persistent biased beliefs in favor of more attractive people, the 
welfare losses from allowing beauty-based pay differentials are likely to be small in settings 
without substantial face-to-face interactions. Moreover, if the spectrum of real-world tasks 
exhibits beauty-based performance differentials (which we do not observe in our study), 
eliminating such differentials may lower the quality of matching between workers and jobs, 
leading to welfare losses. Testing for the existence of performance differentials across a number 
of jobs is an important step for future research. 
Our understanding of the beauty premium may be enhanced by the introduction of face-
to-face interactions between employers and workers and between the workers in the bargaining 
task in future experiments.  Further exploration of the potential gift-exchange mechanism behind 
the beauty premium may also be a fruitful direction for future research.   
 
 
  
18 
 
References 
Andreoni, J. and Petrie, R., 2008. Beauty, gender and stereotypes: evidence from laboratory 
experiments. Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 29, 73–93. 
Ayres, I. and Siegelman, P., 1995. Race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car, 
American Economic Review. 83(3), 304–321.  
Becker, G., 1957. The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Berggren, N., Jordahl, H. and Poutvaara, P., 2010. The looks of a winner: beauty, gender, and 
electoral success. Journal of Public Economics, 94(1–2), 8–15. 
Berri, D. J., Simmons, R., Van Gilder, J., and O'Neill, L., 2011. What does it mean to find the 
face of the franchise? Physical attractiveness and the evaluation of athletic performance. 
Economic Letters, 111, 200–202. 
Biddle, J. and Hamermesh, D., 1998. Beauty, productivity, and discrimination: lawyers’ looks 
and lucre. Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 16(1), 172–201. 
Blanco, M., Engelmann, D., Koch, A. K., and Normann, H-T., 2010. Belief elicitation in 
experiments: is there a hedging problem? Experimental Economics, 13, 412–438. 
von Bose, C., 2012. Child stars vs. ugly ducklings: does adolescent attractiveness contribute to 
the beauty premium? Working paper, The University of Texas at Austin. 
Bottomley, L., Parry, E., Brigade, S., Coley, L., Deam, L., Goodson, E., Kidwell, J., Linck, J, 
and Robinson, B., 2001. Lessons learned from the implementation of a GK-12 grant outreach 
program. Proceedings of the 2001 American Society for Engineering Education Annual 
Conference & Exposition, American Society for Engineering Education. 
Castillo, M., Petrie, R., Torero, M., and Vesterlund, L., 2012. Gender differences in bargaining 
outcomes: a field experiment on discrimination. NBER Working paper No. 18093. 
Chambers, D. W., 1983. Stereotypic images of the scientist: the draw the scientist test. Science 
Education, 67(2), 255–265. 
Cooper, D. J. and Fang, H., 2008. Understanding overbidding in second price auctions: 
an experimental study. The Economic Journal, 118, 1572–1595. 
Corbett, W. R., 2011. Hotness discrimination: appearance discrimination as a mirror for 
reflecting on the body of employment-discrimination law. Catholic University Law Review, 60 
Cath. U.L. Rev. 615. 
Deryugina, T. and Shurchkov, O., 2013. Is there a beauty premium in undergraduate education? 
Working paper, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. 
Duarte J., Siegel, S. and Young, L., 2012. Trust and credit: the role of appearance in peer-to-peer 
lending. Review of Financial Studies, 25(8), 2455–2484. 
19 
 
Fischbacher, U., 2007. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171–178. 
Gächter, S. and Renner, E., 2010. The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods 
experiments. Experimental Economics, 13, 364–377. 
Global Workplace Analytics, 2011. The state of telework in the US – five year trend and 
forecast. http://www.globalworkplaceanalytics.com/whitepapers 
Hamermesh, D. and Biddle, J., 1994. Beauty and the labor market. American Economic Review, 
84(5), 1174–1194. 
Hamermesh, D., 2011. Beauty Pays: Why Attractive People Are More Successful. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Mocan, N. and Tekin, E., 2010. Ugly criminals. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(1),  
15–30. 
Mobius, M. M. and Rosenblat, T. S., 2006. Why beauty matters. American Economic Review, 
96(1), 222–235. 
Pallais, A., 2013. Inefficient hiring in entry-level labor markets. Working paper, Harvard 
University. 
Ravina, E., 2009. Love & loans: the effect of beauty and personal characteristics in credit 
markets. Working Paper, Columbia University. 
Rosenblat, T., 2008. The beauty premium: physical attractiveness and gender in dictator games. 
Negotiation Journal, 24(4), 465–481. 
Solnick, S. J., and Schweitzer, M. E., 1999. The influence of physical attractiveness and gender 
on ultimatum game decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79(3), 
199–215. 
Wilson, R. K., and Eckel, C. C., 2006. Judging a book by its cover: beauty and expectations in a 
trust game. Political Research Quarterly, 59(2), 189–202. 
Table 1 
Treatment Summary 
 
Notes:  Round 1 and Round 2 rows list all sessions, whether the task was the same or different in the second round. 
Sessions with the same task in both rounds are listed in the row labeled “Round 1 = 2.” 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary statistics of experimental outcomes by task and gender 
 
Notes:  The means for Employers are separated by male and female employers. The means for Workers are 
separated by male and female workers. Significance levels based on t-tests of differences between male and female 
subjects: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent. A Mann-Whitney U test that compares distributions produces similar results. 
 
  
# Sessions #Subjects # Sessions #Subjects # Sessions #Subjects
Round 1 16 128 15 120 16 128
Round 2 15 120 16 128 16 128
Round 1 = 2 7 56 8 64 8 64
Data Entry Data Analysis Bargaining
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Employers
   Wage Bid (Points) 27.6 27.9 23.6 24.6 27.9 28.9
   Average Prediction (Points) 70.1 73.3 10.4 11.4 61.6 64.2
   Payoff (Points) 89.4 91.4 98.8 87.6 77.6 80.5
   Observations 18 41 19 38 22 36
Workers
   Own Prediction (Points) 88.6 89.4 10.5 9.5 68.7* 60.4*
   Performance (Points) 83.6 91.5 7.2 7.2 79.5** 55.5**
   Payoff (Points) 108.1 107.9 72.7 78.6 102.5** 83.2**
   Observations 15 44 36 23 26 33
Employers
   Wage Bid (Points) 32.5 30.3 22.1 23.7 25.5* 30.2*
   Average Prediction (Points) 85.9** 78.3** 9.2 9.1 70.4 64.2
   Payoff (Points) 91.2 90.7 88.2 93.2 78.7 68.4
   Observations 21 37 20 39 18 39
Workers
   Own Prediction (Points) 106.0 92.8 10.2 9.8 68.3 66.1
   Performance (Points) 86.3 84.9 11.1 8.5 70.3 63.7
   Payoff (Points) 103.8 116.4 83.9* 72.0* 92.7 81.9
   Observations 22 36 36 24 19 40
Data Entry Data Analysis Bargaining
Panel 1: Averages for Round 1
Panel 2: Averages for Round 2
Table 3 
Summary statistics of attractiveness and other subject characteristics 
 
Notes: Skills are measured on a scale of 0–2, with 2 representing excellent. Resume GPA is measured on a scale of 
0–3, with 3 representing the range 3.5–4.0. Major is 1 for Humanities; 2 for Social Sciences; 3 for Natural Sciences. 
Significance levels based on t-tests of differences between male and female subjects: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, 
***1 percent. 
 
Table 4 
The beauty premium by task for all workers and by worker gender in both rounds 
Notes: The attractiveness coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation change in beauty 
on the outcome variable.  All regressions include date fixed effects. In cases where we pool the data across multiple 
tasks, we also include a task fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered by employer in parentheses. 
Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.  
Male Female Male Female
Demeaned Attractiveness Rating -0.011 0.010 -0.067 0.054
Analytical Skills 1.76*** 1.56*** 1.66 1.59
Typing Skills 1.40*** 1.66*** 1.40 1.53
Communication Skills 1.76* 1.65* 1.60 1.61
Resume GPA 2.39** 2.58** 2.49 2.57
Observations 59 115 77 100
Exact GPA 3.45** 3.54** 3.51 3.54
Major 2.22 2.15 2.17 2.14
Share Native English Speakers 0.93** 0.79** 0.86 0.83
Employers Workers
Panel 1: Resume Characteristics
Panel 2: Other Characteristics
Outcome variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All 
Tasks
Data 
Entry
Data 
Analysis Barg.
All 
Tasks
Data 
Entry
Data 
Analysis Barg.
Attractiveness of worker 0.162*** 0.087 0.144 0.235** 0.158*** 0.176 0.086 0.231**
(0.056) (0.093) (0.106) (0.094) (0.056) (0.132) (0.082) (0.091)
Observations 685 232 225 228 685 225 236 224
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05
Attractiveness of worker
if female 0.197*** 0.041 0.261** 0.328*** 0.229*** 0.524*** 0.103 0.160
(0.065) (0.103) (0.126) (0.105) (0.079) (0.160) (0.125) (0.126)
if male 0.116 0.306 0.037 0.211 0.052 -0.384 0.066 0.422*
(0.096) (0.265) (0.151) (0.143) (0.096) (0.254) (0.091) (0.227)
F-test p-value (equality) [0.470] [0.367] [0.237] [0.473] [0.188] [0.004] [0.804] [0.373]
Observations 685 232 225 228 685 225 236 224
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05
 Natural logarithm of employer wage bid
ROUND 1 ROUND 2
Panel 1: All workers
Panel 2: Males versus females
Table 5 
Relationship between an employer bid in round 1 and worker attractiveness 
Notes: Round 1 data only.  Mean wage bids (in points) for each task are reported in brackets below the task type. 
The attractiveness coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation change in beauty on the 
outcome variable.  The p-values for the f-tests of joint differences of the coefficients on the attractiveness quintiles 
are reported in brackets below the estimates. All regressions include date fixed effects, indicators for student status 
(graduate or undergraduate), major, GPA range, self-reported abilities, race, and gender. In cases where we pool the 
data across multiple tasks, we also include a task fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered by employer in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
  
Outcome variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Attractiveness of worker 0.136** 0.011 0.159 0.280**
(0.060) (0.114) (0.130) (0.112)
Attractiveness quintiles:
2nd 0.026 0.752* -0.469 0.384
(0.205) (0.381) (0.382) (0.487)
3rd 0.101 0.671* 0.409 0.357
(0.187) (0.384) (0.371) (0.450)
4th 0.395** 0.974** 0.512 0.572
(0.182) (0.393) (0.330) (0.432)
Top attractiveness: 5th 0.305 0.16 -0.022 0.996**
(0.212) (0.414) (0.352) (0.435)
F-test p-value (equality) [0.136] [0.171] [0.024] [0.248]
Observations 685 685 232 232 225 225 228 228
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.20 0.21
 Natural logarithm of employer wage bid in round 1
[26.9] [27.9] [24.3] [28.5]
All Tasks Data Entry Data Analysis Bargaining
Table 6 
Relationship between employer performance expectations and worker attractiveness in round 1 
Notes: Round 1 data only.  Mean predicted performance (in points) for each task is reported in brackets below the 
task type. The attractiveness coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation change in 
beauty on the outcome variable.  The p-values for the f-tests of joint differences of the coefficients on the 
attractiveness quintiles are reported in brackets below the estimates. All regressions include date fixed effects, 
indicators for student status (graduate or undergraduate), major, GPA range, self-reported abilities, race, and gender. 
In cases where we pool the data across multiple tasks, we also include a task fixed effect. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by employer in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
 
  
Outcome variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Attractiveness of worker 0.022 -0.016 -0.192 0.043*
(0.018) (0.041) (0.151) (0.025)
Attractiveness quintiles:
   2nd -0.020 -0.037 0.160** -0.132
(0.077) (0.054) (0.080) (0.253)
3rd -0.068 -0.074 0.010 -0.136
(0.057) (0.149) (0.064) (0.170)
4th 0.030 -0.074 0.081 0.110
(0.052) (0.086) (0.061) (0.131)
Top attractiveness: 5th 0.050 -0.035 -0.025 0.118*
(0.042) (0.069) (0.074) (0.072)
F-test p-value (equality) [0.360] [0.950] [0.126] [0.208]
Observations 685 685 232 232 225 225 228 228
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.23
[72.2] [55.5] [63.0]
Natural logarithm of employer performance prediction in round 1
All Tasks Data Entry Data Analysis Bargaining
[63.6]
Table 7 
Relationship between a worker attractiveness and performance in round 1 
Notes: Round 1 data only.  Mean worker performance (in points) for each task is reported in brackets below the task 
type. The attractiveness coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation change in beauty 
on the outcome variable.  The p-values for the f-tests of joint differences on the coefficients of attractiveness 
quintiles are reported in brackets below the estimates. All regressions include date fixed effects, indicators for 
student status (graduate or undergraduate), major, GPA range, self-reported abilities, race, and gender.  
Specifications (7) and (8) include an indicator for whether a trade was possible and control for the average 
difference between buyer value and seller cost across the three bargaining rounds. In cases where we pool the data 
across multiple tasks, we also include a task fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered by worker in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
  
Outcome variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Attractiveness of worker 0.004 -0.121 -0.022 -0.054
(0.047) (0.083) (0.051) (0.167)
Attractiveness quintiles:
2nd 0.028 -0.143 0.122 -0.612
(0.166) (0.326) (0.184) (0.728)
3rd -0.114 -0.352 -0.028 -0.256
(0.198) (0.294) (0.164) (0.613)
4th 0.152 -0.319 -0.05 0.459
(0.163) (0.373) (0.159) (0.717)
Top attractiveness: 5th -0.038 -0.507 -0.015 -0.25
(0.174) (0.329) (0.212) (0.593)
F-test p-value (equality) [0.399] [0.154] [0.582] [0.290]
Observations 177 177 59 59 59 59 59 59
R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.54 0.59 0.68 0.69 0.50 0.55
Natural logarithm of worker performance in round 1
[63.8] [89.5] [35.8] [66.1]
All Tasks Data Entry Data Analysis Bargaining
Table 8 
Separating statistical from taste-based discrimination 
 
Notes: Round 1 data only.  The attractiveness coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard 
deviation change in beauty on the outcome variable.   All regressions include date fixed effects, indicators for 
student status (graduate or undergraduate), major, GPA range, self-reported abilities, race, and gender. In cases 
where we pool the data across multiple tasks, we also include a task fixed effect. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by employer in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
Outcome variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Attractiveness of worker 0.081 -0.018 0.136 0.078
(0.056) (0.105) (0.127) (0.113)
Attractiveness quintiles:
2nd 0.12 0.775* -0.474 0.504
(0.192) (0.399) (0.349) (0.451)
3rd 0.085 0.526 0.43 0.336
(0.172) (0.405) (0.353) (0.380)
4th 0.379** 0.869** 0.413 0.34
(0.166) (0.388) (0.309) (0.412)
Top attractiveness: 5th 0.225 0.292 -0.039 0.373
(0.184) (0.413) (0.320) (0.387)
F-test p-value (equality) [0.238] [0.174] [0.053] [0.980]
Employer's performance 
prediction rank: 2nd 0.652*** 0.652*** 0.842*** 0.826*** 0.231 0.181 0.799** 0.834***
(0.164) (0.164) (0.268) (0.270) (0.290) (0.293) (0.306) (0.313)
3rd 1.368*** 1.374*** 1.162*** 1.171*** 0.820*** 0.749*** 1.849*** 1.867***
(0.172) (0.170) (0.282) (0.280) (0.2780) (0.269) (0.298) (0.293)
Top prediction rank: 4th 1.680*** 1.685*** 1.538*** 1.478*** 1.279*** 1.230*** 2.010*** 2.059***
(0.187) (0.186) (0.317) (0.313) (0.356) (0.352) (0.342) (0.341)
F-test p-value (joint sign.) [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0054] [0.0065] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Observations 685 685 232 232 225 225 228 228
R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.40
 Natural logarithm of employer wage bid in round 1
All Tasks Data Entry Data Analysis Bargaining
Table 9 
Relationship between an employer bid in round 2 and worker attractiveness 
Notes: Round 2 data only.  The attractiveness coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation 
change in beauty on the outcome variable.  All regressions include date fixed effects, indicators for student status 
(graduate or undergraduate), major, GPA range, self-reported abilities, race, and gender. In cases where we pool the data 
across multiple tasks, we also include a task fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered by employer in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
 
 
 
Table 10 
The role of employer performance expectations in the second round 
Notes: Round 2 data only.  The attractiveness coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation 
change in beauty on the outcome variable.  All regressions include date fixed effects, indicators for student status (graduate 
or undergraduate), major, GPA range, self-reported abilities, race, and gender. In cases where we pool the data across 
multiple tasks, we also include a task fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered by employer in parentheses. 
Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
  
Outcome variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Attractiveness of worker 0.100 0.102* 0.285 0.319 0.213 0.107 0.028 0.065
(0.063) (0.061) (0.241) (0.234) (0.146) (0.122) (0.132) (0.133)
Log performance in round 1 0.815*** 0.808** 1.058*** 0.664***
(0.085) (0.338) (0.180) (0.136)
Observations 685 685 225 225 236 236 224 224
R-squared 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.35 0.19 0.28
 Natural logarithm of employer wage bid in round 2
All Tasks Data Entry Data Analysis Bargaining
Outcome variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All 
Tasks
Data 
Entry
Data 
Analysis Barg.
All 
Tasks
Data 
Entry
Data 
Analysis Barg.
Attractiveness of worker -0.010 0.012 -0.011 -0.061 0.087 0.146 0.100 0.033
(0.018) (0.045) (0.032) (0.043) (0.056) (0.177) (0.092) (0.105)
Log performance in round 1 0.460*** 0.255** 0.396*** 0.519*** 0.304*** 0.121 0.450** 0.357**
(0.066) (0.107) (0.063) (0.109) (0.087) (0.290) (0.177) (0.155)
Employer's performance 
prediction rank: 2nd 0.925*** 1.324*** 0.853*** 0.700**
(0.166) (0.318) (0.286) (0.308)
3rd 1.581*** 2.023*** 1.570*** 1.026**
(0.182) (0.457) (0.236) (0.412)
Top prediction rank: 4th 2.109*** 2.238*** 1.982*** 1.675***
(0.183) (0.391) (0.315) (0.385)
Observations 685 225 236 224 685 225 236 224
R-squared 0.50 0.33 0.44 0.50 0.36 0.37 0.49 0.34
 Natural logarithm of employer 
prediction in round 2
 Natural logarithm of employer wage 
bid in round 2
Table 11 
Relationship between employer bid in round 1 and worker attractiveness by worker gender 
 
Notes: Round 1 data only.  The attractiveness coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation 
change in beauty on the outcome variable.  The p-values for the f-tests of joint differences of the coefficients on the 
gender interactions are reported in brackets below the estimates. All regressions include date fixed effects and indicators 
for student status (graduate or undergraduate), major, GPA range, self-reported abilities, race, and gender.  Robust 
standard errors are clustered by employer in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
Outcome variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Data Entry
Data 
Analysis Barg. Data Entry
Data 
Analysis Barg.
Attractiveness of worker
if female -0.031 0.170 0.285** -0.065 0.155 0.141
(0.137) (0.150) (0.123) (0.127) (0.144) (0.124)
if male 0.169 0.150 0.274 0.154 0.119 -0.009
(0.286) (0.177) (0.201) (0.264) (0.175) (0.195)
F-test p-value (equality) [0.557] [0.923] [0.961] [0.490] [0.856] [0.522]
Employer's performance 
prediction rank: 2nd 0.844*** 0.232 0.797**
(0.267) (0.291) (0.303)
3rd 1.175*** 0.823*** 1.855***
(0.278) (0.280) (0.298)
Top prediction rank: 4th 1.529*** 1.277*** 2.033***
(0.316) (0.358) (0.336)
Observations 232 225 228 232 225 228
R-squared 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.31 0.32 0.39
 Natural logarithm of employer wage bid in round 1
Table 12 
Determinants of employer expectations about worker performance and actual performance by gender 
 
Notes: Round 1 data only.  The attractiveness coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation 
change in beauty on the outcome variable.  The p-values for the f-tests of joint differences of the coefficients on the gender 
interactions are reported in brackets below the estimates. All regressions include date fixed effects and indicators for student 
status (graduate or undergraduate), major, GPA range, self-reported abilities, race, and gender.  Column (6) includes an 
indicator for whether a trade was possible and control for the average difference between buyer value and seller cost across 
the three bargaining rounds. Robust standard errors are clustered by employer (Columns 1–3) or worker (Columns 4–6) in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. 
 
Outcome variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Data Entry
Data 
Analysis Barg. Data Entry
Data 
Analysis Barg.
Attractiveness of worker
if female 0.003 0.022 -0.005 -0.090 0.033 -0.193
(0.041) (0.023) (0.020) (0.087) (0.076) (0.191)
if male -0.087 -0.091* 0.105*** -0.243 -0.069 0.155
(0.068) (0.048) (0.035) (0.154) (0.069) (0.232)
F-test p-value (equality) [0.152] [0.036] [0.001] [0.370] [0.329] [0.208]
Observations 232 225 228 59 59 59
R-squared 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.55 0.68 0.51
Natural log of employer performance 
prediction in round 1
Natural log of actual worker 
performance in round 1
